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Professional Responsibility
By PAUL C.

VAN BoOVEN*

Since the last Kentucky Law Survey article on Professional
Responsibility,' the Kentucky Supreme Court has published 2 surprisingly few cases disciplining attorneys. During this time the
Court has had the opportunity to respond to a major criticism
levied in that article:
Considerable improvement in the Court's regulation of misconduct within the legal profession could be obtained by the
abandonment of the current use of unduly abbreviated opinions in disciplinary cases. Such opinions generally provide no
guidance to the Court's construction of the Code or the factors
3
it has relied upon in imposing a particular sanction.
With few exceptions, however, the Court has continued to provide Kentucky lawyers with only skeletal background facts in
the disciplinary cases it has decided, 4 and to routinely omit
* Associate Dean, University of Kentucky College of Law. B.A. 1973, DePauw
University; J.D. 1976, University of Kentucky.
I Gaetke & Casey, The Kentucky Law Survey-ProfessionalResponsibility, 70
KY. L.J. 325 (1981-82) (covering the period July 1979 to December 1981). The present
Survey covers the period January 1982 through September 1984. For a discussion of the
Kentucky disciplinary process, see id. at 325 n.3, 326 n.7.
The Court may also admonish or issue private reprimands, which are not made
public. KY. Sup. CT. R. 3.380. [hereinafter cited as SCR].
Gaetke & Casey, supra note I, at 341.
See, e.g., Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Gregory, 659 S.W.2d 204 (Ky. 1983). The full
text of the opinion and order is as follows:
In a disciplinary proceeding, the Board of Governors of the Kentucky Bar
Association concluded that the respondent was guilty of five counts of
unethical and unprofessional conduct calculated to bring the bench and
bar into disrepute. The Board recommends that the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months and that
he be required to pay the costs of this action.
The Court, having considered the record and the briefs of the parties,
adopts the findings and recommendations of the Board of Governors.
The respondent is hereby suspended for a period of three (3) months
and directed hereby to pay the costs of this proceeding. Respondent is
further directed to comply wth SCR 3.390.
Id. at 205. See also Gaetke & Casey, supra note 1, at 326 n.6 for a discussion of the
brevity of opinions issued by the Court.
It is apparent that Gregory gives practicing lawyers no guidance (though perhaps
it does have some in terrorem effect), but serves only as public notice that Gregory was

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL[

[Vol. 73

citation to, or discussion of, specific provisions of the Code of

Professional Responsibility [Code]. 5 The Court's chief reason
for imposing discipline continues to be violation of the rule
prohibiting attorneys from engaging in "conduct calculated to
'6
bring the bench and bar into disrepute."
7
With the exception of Kentucky Bar Association v. Smith,
the decisions of the Court during the Survey period were unre-

markable and will be only briefly summarized.
I.

MISUSE OF CLIENT FUNDS

Consistent with its pattern of severely disciplining attorneys
who misuse client funds,8 the Court disbarred one attorney for

misappropriating client funds and for being convicted of a felony
involving dishonesty. 9 Noting that the conviction alone was suf-

ficient to warrant disbarment, 0 the Court observed that "in

dealing with money belonging to his clients, the lawyer is trustee
of an express trust, and failure to observe the highest standards

of honesty in this respect inevitably results in disbarment.""
suspended. In other cases, however, the Court did a better job of detailing the facts and
explaining its reasoning, sometimes even relying on the American Bar Association
[hereinafter cited as ABA] displinary standards as published in MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1969) [hereinafter cited as MODEL CODE]. In Kentucky Bar Ass'n
v. Fitzgerald, 652 S.W.2d 77 (Ky. 1983), the Court, citing MODEL CODE, DR 9-101(A)
[hereinafter cited as DR], reprimanded a former judge for accepting employment in a
matter upon the merits of which he had acted in a judicial capacity. In Kentucky Bar
Ass'n v. Tiller, 641 S.W.2d 421 (Ky. 1982), the court suspended the attorney for six
months for aiding a collection agency in the unauthorized practice of law. The Court
fully described the attorney's involvement in the scheme and cited both DR 1-102(A)(6)
("A lawyer shall not... engage in other conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law.") and DR 3-101(A) ("A lawyer shall not aid a non-lawyer in the unauthorized practice of law.") as the basis for its decision. 641 S.W.2d at 421-22.
The Model Code has been adopted by the Kentucky Supreme Court. See SCR
3.130(1).
6 Id.

No. 83-SC-144-KB (Ky. July 5, 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 514 (1984).
See Gaetke & Casey, supra note 1, at 327-31.
See Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Johnson, 660 S.W.2d 671 (Ky. 1983).
10 See id. at 672.
11See id. (citing Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Tucker, 535 S.W.2d 97 (Ky.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1054 (1975) and Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Collis, 535 S.W.2d 95 (Ky.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1049 (1975)). It should be noted that the Court did not rely on DR 9-102,
which governs the handling of client funds. Johnson was disbarred for "unethical and
unprofessional conduct calculated to bring the bench and bar into disrepute." See id.
at 672. In the Johnson case, the Court did develop the facts sufficiently to give lawyers
an indication of what conduct was punished.

19851
II.

PRoFEssIoNAL RESPONSIBILITY
MISREPRESENTATION, FALSE STATEMENTS, AND NEGLECT

The Court decided several cases involving neglect of clients
and related misconduct. In one consolidated case, Kentucky Bar
Association v. Eubanks, 2 the attorney was disbarred for what
the Court called a "continuing pattern of neglect and misconduct."" 3 Although stating that it was "not disposed to detail all
the facts,"' 4 the Court did relate the chain of events that led to
the disbarment. After accepting cases and fees, Eubanks typically
refused to communicate with clients; when he did communicate
with clients he would often lie to them; and he refused to honor
5
client requests for the refund of unearned fees.
When compared with a 1982 case involving neglect of clients'
affairs, Kentucky Bar Association v. Reed, 6 the punishment in
Eubanks seems harsh. In Reed, the Court again specifically
declined to give an adequate set of facts:
We are not disposed to detail all the facts in this case. Respondent was charged with a statement of facts which display
gross neglect of a legal matter entrusted to respondent, wilful
refusal to respond to communications from his client and to
communicate in any way with the client regarding the nature
and extent of his activities upon behalf of his client. 17
Noting that he had previously been suspended for similar
conduct, 8 the Court imposed a two year suspension on Reed.' 9
With the sparse factual details given in the Eubanks and
Reed opinions, there is no way to reconcile the different punish20
ments in these two cases.

n 647 S.W.2d 789 (Ky. 1983).
" See id. at 789. Once again, the attorney involved was charged with engaging in
"conduct calculated to bring the Bench and Bar into disrepute." See id.
" Id.
" Id.
In passing, the Court twice noted that Eubanks had failed to respond to the
charges against him. See id.
16 631 S.W.2d 633 (Ky. 1982).
"7 Id. The Court noted that Reed also had not responded to the charges brought
against him by the Board of Governors of the Kentucky Bar Association. Id.
Is See Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Reed, 623 S.W.2d 228 (Ky. 1981).
9 See 631 S.W.2d 633.
20But see Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Harris, 636 S.W.2d 646 (Ky. 1982), where the
Court suspended an attorney for one year for failure to achieve a final settlement of an
estate. In Harris, the Court carefully detailed the facts-failure of the attorney to consult
with beneficiaries, appear in court, and file necessary accountings-and supported the
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ADVERTISING VIOLATIONS

In Kentucky Bar Association v. Gangwish,2' the Court reprimanded Gangwish for advertising a twenty percent discount
on legal services in violation of Kentucky Supreme Court Rule
3.135.22 The Court based its decision on an analysis of In re
R.M.J.,23 the most recent United States Supreme Court opinion
on attorney advertising. The Kentucky Supreme Court held:
It is apparent that advertising as to fees is limited to fees
charged for certain routine services and that misleading advertising can be prohibited. We are of the opinion that advertising
a "20% discount on legal services" is not advertising of fees
24
for routine legal services and is misleading in every respect.
IV.

WITiDRAWAL

As

COUNSEL

The Court sent a clear signal to the bar that care should be
taken to withdraw formally as counsel whenever an attorney is
discharged by the client or will no longer handle the case for
some reason. In one case, 25 the Court reprimanded an attorney
for failing to inform the trial court that his client had discharged
him from his capacity as court-appointed attorney.2 6 In another
case,2 7 an attorney who moved out of the state without informing

punishment given by citing its previous decisions involving similar misconduct. See id.
Though brief, this opinion illustrates a desirable approach to disciplinary cases.
See also Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Albert, 668 S.W.2d 62 (Ky. 1984) where an
attorney was reprimanded for failure to accurately advise the client of the status of his
case. The attorney had informed his client that "various procedural and pretrial actions"
were being taken when in fact the client's case had been dismissed for want of prosecution. See id. While the Court gave considerable attention to the facts of the case, it
failed to cite either Code provisions or prior case law to support its decision to publicly
reprimand the attorney. See id.
21 630 S.W.2d 66 (Ky. 1982).
SCR 3.135 is Kentucky's rule on attorney advertising.
455 U.S. 191 (1982).
630 S.W.2d at 67.
Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Kemper, 637 S.W.2d 637 (Ky. 1982). After his initial
discharge by the client, Kemper had been rehired by the client and had been paid a
fee. When the judge who had initially appointed Kemper to represent the client learned
of the arrangement, he was "incensed" and informed the bar association. See id. at
638.
26 See id.
" Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Reid, 665 S.W.2d 311 (KY. 1984).
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clients, refunding unearned fees, or withdrawing as counsel in
28
pending cases was suspended from practice for three years.
V.

DIsQUALMCATION OF OPPOSING COUNSEL

In Summit v. Mudd,29 the Court addressed the issue of
whether an entire Commonwealth Attorney's office should be
disqualified, on the basis of imputed confidential knowledge,
from prosecuting a case.
The case arose when a member of the Jefferson County
Public Defender's Office was hired by the Commonwealth Attorney as an assistant prosecutor. Shortly before leaving the
Public Defender's Office, this attorney had been appointed to
represent a defendant in a criminal prosecution by the attorney's
new employer. In a motion denied by the circuit court, the
defendant sought to disqualify the entire staff of the Commonwealth Attorney's office on ethical grounds.30 The Supreme Court
remanded the case to the circuit court with instructions "to hold
a hearing to determine if there has been any actual prejudice or
actual breach of the attorney/client confidentiality."'" The Court
said that actual prejudice must be shown before the entire staff
would be disqualified and that "[t]he mere possibility of the
appearance of impropriety is not sufficient to disqualify the
entire staff ... 32
The Court noted that the main consideration in such cases
is whether the attorneys have behaved ethically. 33 Observing that
lawyers are obligated to protect clients from the prejudice which
can result from breaches of confidentiality, the Court concluded
that, even in the circumstances of this case, it was "wrong to
automatically assume that a lawyer who [formerly] represented
a client ... will violate the very strong ethical considerations of
'34
attorney/client confidentiality."

See id. at 311.
" 679 S.W.2d 225 (Ky. 1984).
" See id. at 225.
" Id. at 226.
Id. at 225. See DR 5-105(D) (1969); and MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1.9(b), 1.10 and 1.11 (1983) [hereinafter cited as MODEL RTES]. The Court noted
that the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 342
(1975), held DR 5-105(D) inapplicable to government lawyers. 679 S.W.2d at 226.
See id. at 226.
' See id. The result would probably have been different in civil litigaton. For a
11
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Kentucky Bar Association v. Smith

The recent disciplinary case which generated the most interest
among Kentucky lawyers was Kentucky Bar Association v.
Smith. 31 There are two reasons for this interest. First, the Court's
opinion is not clear about exactly what Smith did or did not do
to warrant his eighteen-month suspension. 6 Second, a broad
reading of the opinion seems to indicate that, even though
adhering to the Code's Disciplinary Rules, a lawyer who is
involved in business relationships with clients is risking profes37
sional discipline.
The gist of the Court's statement of the facts is that Smith
was representing Dr. Nath on an ongoing basis when Dr. Nath
invested $30,000 in a real estate investment corporation which
was also represented by Smith and in which Smith owned an
interest. The Court said that it "[did] not attempt to unravel all
the contradictory testimony regarding what [Smith] said and did
[Smith]
in order to persuade Dr. Nath to invest . . . and what
3
testified he said and did in denial [of the charges]."

The Court found that Smith had contemporaneously formed
complete discussion of imputed disqualification rules, see ABA LAWYER'S MANUAL OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (BNA) 51:2001-:2015 (1984).
11No. 83-SC-144-KB (Ky. July 5, 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 514 (1984).
-1 Once again the Court failed to give the full facts of the case or to cite any
Disciplinary Rules which related to Smith's conduct. The formal charge brought by the
Kentucky Bar Association Inquiry Tribunal cited violations of DR 1-102(A)(4), DR 5101(A), DR 5-104(A), DR 5-105(A) and DR 6-I01(A)(3), and alleged that Smith's actions
in violation of those rules constituted "unethical and unprofessional conduct tending to
bring the bench and bar of Kentucky into disrepute." Brief for Complainant, App. 1,
at 5, Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Smith, No. 83-SC-144-KB, slip op.
The Report of the Trial Commissioner likewise mentioned these rules, but did not
apply them to the facts he found. The Supreme Court Rules call for the Trial Commissioner to file a "written report in the nature of findings of fact relating to guilt or
innocence." SCR 3.360.
The Opinion of the Board of Governors concluded that:
Smith's conduct violated the provisions of DR 1-102 [Engaging in Deceit
or Misrepresentation], DR 5-101, and 5-105 [Accepting Employment which
Affects the Independence of the Lawyer or Impairs the Client's Interests]
and DR 6-101 [Neglecting a Legal Matter Entrusted to the Lawyer], and
that, in sum this conduct has brought the Bench and Bar into disrepute;
SCR 3.130(l).
Brief for Complainant, App. 3, at 3, Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Smith, No. 83-SC-144-KB,
slip op.
17 See notes 44-48 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the applicable
disciplinary rules.
11 No. 83-SC-144-KB, slip op. at 3.
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a holding corporation-"an extension of Dr. Nath personally" 39that actually made the loan to the real estate investment corporation. Smith had performed all of the legal work for the real
estate venture, owned an interest in it, had represented Nath and
one of Nath's corporations "generally",40 and had engaged in
"activities culminating in preparing a check and, to that extent,
participated in a transaction whereby one client lent money to a
corporation in which [Smith] had a substantial interest." '4' Thus,
the Court concluded, "a lawyer simply cannot defend against a
charge of unethical and unprofessional conduct in such a scen42
ario."
Observing that this was a case of first impression in Kentucky, the Court concluded:
[This case] should illustrate that we are committed to the
proposition that, in financial dealings with a client, a lawyer
must exercise the utmost good faith and fidelity to a client and
not place himself or herself in a position of participating in a
transaction... so as to bring the bench and bar into disrepute.
The unethical and unprofessional conduct here and the consequential loss of money by a client, Dr. Nath, is in our
opinion such unethical and unprofessional conduct as to war43
rant the suspension of respondent.
Most lawyers realize that there is a problem with potential
conflicts of interest when a lawyer enters into a business transaction with a client or when a lawyer undertakes the concurrent
representation of two clients. Since the Smith decision does not
discuss the provisions of the Code which address these issues, a
short description is given below for guidance to Kentucky lawyers.
A.

Business Transactions with Clients

The Code discourages business transactions between a lawyer
and his or her clients. 44 The reason is apparent. In such a
situation it is likely that the attorney's financial interests may
Id., slip op. at 4.
SId.
41Id., slip op. at 5.
42Id.
43Id.
" See MODEL CODE EC 5-3 (1985). For a full explanation of potential conflicts
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affect his or her exercise of independent professional judgment.
However, the Code does not prohibit those transactions. It

simply states: "A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client if they have differing interests therein and
if the client expects the lawyer to exercise his professional judg-

ment therein for the protection of the client, unless the client

has consented after full disclosure." ' 45 It is clear from a reading
of Smith that the Court chose not to follow the Code requirements of determining whether Dr. Nath expected Smith to be

his lawyer in the loan transaction or whether there was consent
or full disclosure. 46 Thus it is probably prudent for Kentucky
lawyers to look beyond the Code for guidance in such business

transactions.
The ABA's proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct
[Model Rules] 47 set a different, stricter standard for dealing with
clients in business ventures. The Model Rules would require that
the transaction be "fair," that the client be given a reasonable
and that the
opportunity to seek the advice of another lawyer
48
arrangement.
the
to
writing
in
client consent
Because of the uncertainty left by the Smith opinion, it would
be wise for Kentucky lawyers who engage in business arrangements with their clients to follow the dictates of the Model

arising from transactions between lawyer and client, see ABA

LAWYER'S MANUAL ON

PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (BNA) 51:501-:505 (1984).
41 DR 5-104(A) (emphasis added).
defense that it was not established
46 For example, the Court said that "[Smith's]
that he represented Dr. Nath in this transaction is a non-defense." Kentucky Bar Ass'n
v. Smith, No. 83-SC-144-KB (Ky. July 5, 1984). The Court also stated: "Whether Dr.
Nath knew that [Smith] owned an interest . . . [is] beside the point." Id.
"' The Model Rules of Professional Conduct were adopted by the House of
Delegates of the American Bar Association on August 2, 1983 after years of debate.
The MODEL RULES were designed to replace the ABA's Model Code of Professional
Responsibility. See ABA LAWYER'S MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (BNA) 1:101
(1984). The MODEL RULES have not been adopted in Kentucky; the Ethics Committee of
the Kentucky Bar Association is in the process of considering whether to recommend
the adoption of some of the Rules as amendments to the current Code.
MODEL RULE 1.8(a) states:
A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client ... unless:
(1) the transaction and terms . . . are fair and reasonable to the client
and are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing to the client in a
manner which can be reasonably understood by the client;
(2) the client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of
independent counsel in the transaction; and
(3) the client consents in writing thereto.
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Rules, even though the Rules have not been adopted by the
Kentucky Supreme Court.
B.

Representing Multiple Clients

The situation in the Smith case is made more complex because Smith apparently represented both Dr. Nath and the real
estate firm in which Nath invested.4 9 Disciplinary Rule 5-105
controls multiple representation. To represent two or more clients
it must be "obvious" that the lawyer can adequately serve both
clients, and each client must consent to the representation after
full disclosure.50 The Model Rules would require that a lawyer
have a reasonable belief that the representation will not affect
the relationship with the other client, plus consent after consultation .5 The Court did not address the multiple representation
issue directly in Smith.
C. An Approach to Avoid the "Smith" Problem
Because of the uncertainty about whether the Kentucky Supreme Court will begin applying the Code in disciplining errant
lawyers or will instead continue to rely on the standard that
prohibits conduct bringing the bench and bar into disrepute,
Kentucky lawyers should carefully document their business relationships with clients. In addition to following the dictates of
Smith, a lawyer probably should strive to meet the Model Rules'
requirements of fairness, full disclosure, opportunity to seek
See Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Smith, No. 83-SC-144-KB (Ky. July 5, 1984).
: The text of DR 5-105 states in part:
(A) A lawyer shall decline proffered employment if the exercise of his
independent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely
to be adversely affected by the acceptance of the proffered employment,
or if it would involve him in representing different interests, except to the
extent permitted under DR 5-105(C).
B) A lawyer shall not continue multiple employment if the exercise of this
independent professional judgement will be or is likely to be adversely
affected by his representation of another client, or if it would be likely to
involve him in representing differing interests, except to the extent permitted under DR 5-105(C).
C) In the situations covered by DR 5-105 (A) and (B), a lawyer may
represent multiple clients if it is obvsious that he can adequately represent
the interest of each and if each consents to the representation after full disclosure
of the possible effects of such representation on the exercise
of his independent professional judgment on behalf of each.
" See MODEL RULE 1.7.
4

458
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outside counsel, and written consent before initiating or continuing business relationships with clients.
CONCLUSION

This review of decisions in the area of professional ethics
compels the same conclusion drawn by the last Survey. The
Kentucky Supreme Court could improve its regulation of lawyer
misconduct by issuing opinions in disciplinary cases which fully
set out the underlying conduct and which cite to the Court's
adopted Code of Professional Responsibility. Opinions which
meet this standard would serve to better guide the profession
and to provide the public with greater assurance of professional
conduct.

